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Abstract
In this paper we argue that the pre-commitment of legislation caused by the
slowness of the democratic legislative system can yield a self-interested govern-
ment to still choose the socially desirable policies. A simple model illustrates
this point.
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1 Introduction and argumentation
Conventional wisdom has it that one of the major disadvantages of the democratic
legislative system, compared for instance with dictatorial legislation, is that it takes
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very long for any major intended change in the law to go through all the di¤erent
procedures and to be e¤ectuated (see Olsen, 1982). An example of when this lethargy
leads to inferior outcomes is that tax evaders exploiting loopholes in current laws often
have at least a year to close down their interests from the loopholes in the current
law and to start exploiting the loopholes in an intended future law. Other instances
where the legislative system is involved in a rat-race with anticipating adversaries
abound.
In this paper it is argued that this lethargy of the democratic legislative system can
also be an advantage. Often the purpose of a law is to allow individuals to commit
to an agreement whereby laws make such commitment credible. For instance, a
buyer who has a contract in which he receives some item before payment is implicitly
threatened by the judicial system if he reneges on his contractual promise to pay for
the goods he has received. The credible threat from contracting laws then avoids
expensive alternative ways of trading without such a contracting possibility. If laws
would be a matter of continuous and instant renegotiation, this implicit threat would
be much weaker, because it may be time inconsistent.
In cases of time-inconsistency, a continuous possibility of voting on a law and
having it instantly e¤ectuated would lead to an inferior outcome. The lethargy of
the legislative system then provides a way for the legislature to pre-commit on the
current set of laws for the time-period that it would take to draw up, vote on and
e¤ectuate a new set of laws. This lethargy is then the essential pre-commitment
device that upholds a good outcome.
This basic reasoning is illustrated by a simple model with time-inconsistency
where a minimum level of lethargy is required to end up in the good outcome. In
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this model, the optimal level of lethargy is higher when the actions that are a¤ected
take longer to reverse or when governments stay on longer. The latter may seem
somewhat counter-intuitive and arises because when the length of lethargy is longer
than the time in power of a government, no government will benet from starting a
legislative change as it will not be e¤ectuated during its period of government. Then,
current laws are credible.
Lethargy itself is not endogenized in the model, but one can think of many ways in
which lethargy can be made greater or smaller, e.g. by having required consultation
periods on intended laws and various requirements on di¤erent stages an intended
law must pass, which may di¤er according to the purpose of the law.
There are several links with existing literature. On the one hand, there are
studies documenting the lethargy of various legislative institutions and possible cures
for it (see e.g. Olsen, 1982). The need for pre-commitment is well-recognized in
dynamic models where time-inconsistency of policies is an issue (e.g. Asheim, 1997).
The lack of pre-commitment and its consequences is a theme in models of political
economy where specic redistributive programs are involved (see Mulligan and Sala-
i-Martin, 1999, or Tabellini, 2000, and the references therein). These considerations
are reected for instance in the debate on the independence of central banks as a way
of making monetary policy credible (e.g. Rogo¤, 1989). As far we know, however,
no author in political economy has yet linked legislative lethargy to benecial pre-
commitment.
3
2 An illustrative model
We present a continuous-time investment model where foreign investors are invited
to invest capital and hire labour in a country. Consider a small open economy with
at each time t; t = 0; 1; 2; : : : ; a xed amount of immobile labour Lt  L and mo-
bile capital Kt. Marginal production at time t equals y (Kt; Lt) where y(:; :) satises
the Inada conditions. Arbitrary positive levels of investments can be made instanta-
neously by foreign investors. The world interest rate net of world capital taxation is
r. By assumption, it takes tp > 0 amount of time for any investment to be undone
by an investor, i.e., to pull out. This reects either the physical di¢ culty of re-
moving equipment and personnel or the psychic di¢ culty of transferring knowledge.
The government, which needs money to nance a public good, can tax labour and
capital with marginal tax rates Lt and 
C
t . The time-length of legislative lethargy is
determined indirectly by a constitution and equals :
Suppose further that the individuals manning the government change now and
then through a democratic process. This means that it is essentially impossible for
any current government to build up much credibility towards foreign investors (who
dont vote) by sticking to any announced election program. Hence governments are
in power for a length of time equal to 1 and maximize the expected utility in that
period (in which they may give great weight to their own utility). If di¤erent policies
lead to the same utility while in o¢ ce, we assume governments legislate that policy
that has the highest future expected utility.1 Marginal utility at time t is dened as
1This corresponds to an assumption of minimal benevolence. It is the minimal assumption nec-
essary to ensure that there is an initial government whose rst law will coincide in this model with
the long-run optimal law. Without this assumption, any rst or successive government will not set
any legislation in motion if  > 1.
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dUt
dt
= ut = f(y(Kt; Lt)) + g(Lw
L
t +Ktrt (Kt; Lt) 
C
t )
s.t. w = @y(Kt;Lt)@Lt
rt (Kt; Lt) =
@y(Kt;Lt)
@Kt
where f(:) denotes a consumption function of total production; g(:) denotes a posi-
tive and increasing net-benet function of public good provision; Kt is used capital
of foreign investors; w is the marginal productivity of labour and rt (Kt; Lt) is the
marginal productivity of capital, which is a function of both Kt and Lt. The equilib-
rium level of capital is determined by the maximizing behaviour of foreign investors.
We denote the foreign investors expectations at time t  tp with respect to the level
of capital taxation Ct prevailing at time t by Et t0Ct . In a rational expectations
equilibrium it should hold that
 
1  Et t0Ct

rt (Kt; Lt) = r; i.e. the net interest
level in this country should equal world interest rates r. Since Lt is given to equal L
at each time t; this expression can be solved for Kt: Denote the inverse of the function
rt (:; :) with respect to its rst argument, while keeping its second argument xed at
L by r 1t (:) : Thus Kt solves
Kt = IfEt t0Ct <1g r
 1
t (
r
1  Et t0Ct
);
where the indicator function IfEt t0Ct <1g indicates that no investments will be made
unless capital tax is strictly less than 100%: The domestic government inherits a level
of capital taxation. The rst government (at t = 0) can set a level of capital taxation
before investments start.
5
When  = 0; we are in a standard prisoner-dilemma situation, whereby a govern-
ment views the amount of capital invested at time t as given (because investments
are dependent on anticipated tax rates, not actual taxes) and re-legislates the capital
tax rate to be 1 at the end of its term and (by backward induction) each time before
that. Anticipating this, actual investment is 0 at each time independent of the inter-
est rate. Even the short-term maximizing government would have wished it was able
to pre-commit to a di¤erent capital tax level.
A government interested in the long-term, i.e., in the average utility over all
periods, would set labour tax equal to 1 because we have abstracted from any labour
supply issues or aggregate demand issues in this set-up. Capital tax would be set
at a constant level such that the marginal benet of further capital taxation is zero,
which is when
@ut
@Ct
=
@
@Ct
f(y(Kt; L)) +
@
@Ct
g(LtwLt
L
t +Ktrt
C
t ) =
=
@Kt
@Ct
@y(Kt; L)
@Kt
df (x)
dx

x=y(Kt;L)
+
@
@Ct
(LtwLt
L
t +Ktrt
C
t )
dg (x)
dx

x=LtwLt
L
t +Ktrt
C
t
=
=
@Kt
@Ct
rt(Kt; L)f
0 (y(Kt; L)) +

@Kt
@Ct
rt
C
t +Kt
@rt
@Ct
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
g0
 
LtwLt
L
t +Ktrt
C
t

= 0
whose solution we denote by ~C . We can verify that ~C is less than 1.
If a government could pre-commit for a time-length  > minftp;1g on not changing
an announced tax rate because of the lethargy in the legislative system, even the rst
government (at t = 0), who is interested in the utility during its length of o¢ ce, sets
capital taxation at ~C and labour taxation at 1. Successive governments inherit this
level of taxation and do not set legislation in motion to change this. Then, national
utility is highest. The reason for the fact that  > 1 su¢ ces irrespective of tp is that
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if  > 1; governments can only set a change in motion that will be e¤ectuated after
their window of interest, which they will hence not do, making the initial legislated
level of capital equal the only optimal long-run level. In this extreme example where
a government is only interested in the utility during its time in o¢ ce, it sets the
long-run optimal level of capital taxation ~C :
3 Conclusion
This paper makes a simple point which is that the lethargy of the legislative system
can form a benecial pre-commitment device in circumstances of time-inconsistent
optimal policy. This implies that especially if reputation is of little value to politi-
cians, for instance because they are only in power for a short period, the lethargy
of the legislative system provides a protection for long-term interests. Anticipating
this, beneciaries of this form of commitment, such as foreign investors, are more
attracted to countries with more lethargic legislative systems. The more lethargic,
the more irreversible investments they can make without the fear of appropriation
through a tax system.
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